RUNNING THE HEMISPHERE:What America's New Latin America Doctrine Means for Business, Investment, and the Next Decade

On January 3, 2026, at approximately 2 a.m. local time, US Delta Force operators entered a compound in Caracas and removed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from power. Operation Absolute Resolve lasted two hours and twenty-eight minutes. Maduro and his wife were transported to the USS Iwo Jima and subsequently flown to New York City to face narcoterrorism charges. Standing before cameras hours later, President Trump was unambiguous about what had just happened and what it meant: 'We are going to run the country until we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition.' Then, broadening the scope: 'American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again.'

The operation did not end with Venezuela. It was a beginning.

In the months since, the Trump administration has cut off Cuba's oil supply, issued an executive order declaring the island an extraordinary threat to US national security, deployed a carrier strike group to the region, indicted Raul Castro for the 1996 shootdown of Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, and signaled openly that Cuba is 'at the end of the line.' In Colombia, it endorsed Abelardo de la Espriella - a right-wing political outsider who won the presidency on June 22, 2026, with the narrowest margin in the country's modern history - while applying sustained tariff and political pressure on Brazil's Lula government. A US State Department official traveled to Brazil explicitly to visit jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro, only to have his visa revoked.

What is unfolding is not a collection of disconnected foreign policy events. It is the most aggressive and coherent reshaping of US-Latin America policy in three decades - a new hemispheric doctrine built on force, alignment, and the explicit exclusion of extra-hemispheric powers from the region. As historian Greg Grandin observed on NPR in June 2026, 'Trump is basically operating on a model of domination without hegemony - pure force and pure power and, at best, transactional relations.'

For business leaders, investors, and institutions engaged with Latin America, the implications are profound and immediate.

The Architecture of the New Doctrine

To understand what is happening, it is useful to map the sequence. Trump returned to office in January 2025 with a Latin America policy initially focused on two priorities: immigration and drug trafficking. Secretary of State Marco Rubio - a Cuban American from Miami with deep roots in the South Florida diaspora community - became the architect of an increasingly ambitious regional strategy that went well beyond those two issues.

The Venezuela operation was the hinge. By removing Maduro and installing Delcy Rodriguez as a compliant acting president, the Trump administration simultaneously achieved three objectives: eliminated the primary oil lifeline to Cuba, disrupted the financial and logistical infrastructure of the Tren de Aragua gang network that had spread across Latin America and into the United States, and demonstrated to every government in the hemisphere the consequences of defying Washington.

"Going forward, the administration has a unique opportunity to build upon the success of its pressure campaign against Maduro to reestablish overwhelming US strategic predominance in the hemisphere, including by tacitly shaping a post-Maduro settlement that ensures extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas. The success of this operation creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality."

Alexander B. Gray, former Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, White House National Security Council - Atlantic Council, January 3, 2026

The message landed. Within weeks, Mexico halted oil shipments to Cuba. Ecuador deepened security cooperation with the United States. Colombia's incoming president-elect de la Espriella - who has promised to restore intelligence sharing with Washington and pursue 90-day military offensives against armed groups - received early congratulations from Trump and takes office on August 7. The Shield of the Americas, a new US-led multinational security initiative, launched at its inaugural summit in March 2026 - with Trump warning at that summit that 'Cuba's at the end of the line' (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2026). A new regional alignment is taking shape.

Venezuela: Opportunity Inside Uncertainty

For business, Venezuela represents the most complex and potentially consequential opening in the hemisphere. The country sits atop the world's largest proven oil reserves. The Trump administration moved quickly after Maduro's capture to ease sanctions on Venezuela's hydrocarbon sector, issuing licenses that permit US companies to more freely invest in and trade with PDVSA, Venezuela's state oil company, and its subsidiaries. The protected status of Houston-based CITGO from its creditors was extended.

The Brookings Institution noted that Maduro's ouster 'creates a real but narrow opportunity for a durable democratic transition' requiring three critical elements: political legitimacy, economic stabilization, and military realignment. The International Crisis Group was more cautious, warning that the administration's plan to 'run Venezuela remotely' while using economic and financial leverage risks 'leaving Venezuelans worse off than before.'

The business reality is this: Venezuela's energy infrastructure has deteriorated severely under 25 years of mismanagement. The capital requirements for meaningful rehabilitation are enormous - the kind of investment that only comes with a credible, stable governance framework and clear legal protections. Those conditions do not yet exist. What does exist is a first-mover window for companies with the risk appetite to position early. The coming months will determine whether Washington can translate military success into the political and institutional conditions that make Venezuela an investment destination rather than simply a geopolitical trophy.

Cuba: The Squeeze and What Comes After

Cuba is under the most severe economic pressure it has faced since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. The closure of Venezuela's oil lifeline - Cuba's primary energy source for more than two decades - has triggered nationwide blackouts lasting up to 20-22 hours per day in some areas, food and medicine shortages, and three nationwide blackouts in March alone. A senior administration official described the strategy to Axios in May 2026 as 'accelerationism' - deliberately hastening economic collapse to force political change.

"We've never seen this kind of pressure. It's an entirely new ballgame."

Max Meizlish, former US Treasury official specializing in Cuba sanctions - Axios, May 2026

Trump has signaled that Cuba is 'at the end of the line' but has not authorized military intervention, preferring to exhaust economic levers first. The administration issued $100 million in humanitarian aid channeled through the Catholic Church and private organizations - carrots alongside the sticks. Raul Castro's indictment for the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue shootdowns and the deployment of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group to the region in May sent unmistakable signals.

For business, Cuba represents a medium-term watch. A genuine political transition - however messy and uncertain - would open a market of 10 million people less than 100 miles from Florida that has been essentially closed to US commerce for 65 years. The Cuban-American business community in South Florida, which has deep capital, networks, and institutional knowledge, would be positioned to move quickly. CFR fellow Will Freeman has noted that Cuba's tightly controlled system makes internal collapse or rapid regime change unlikely in the short term - but the economic trajectory is unsustainable.

Colombia: The Market That Is Opening Now

Colombia is the immediate business opportunity. De la Espriella takes office August 7 with a mandate to restore security, cut taxes, reduce the state by up to 40 percent, rebuild the intelligence and security relationship with Washington, and attract the foreign direct investment that collapsed 33 percent between 2022 and 2025 under Gustavo Petro. His vice president, Jose Manuel Restrepo, is a trusted technocrat well-known to international financial institutions and the business community.

De la Espriella has already received backing from Trump, Argentina's Milei, Ecuador's Noboa, Chile's Kast, and Paraguay's Pena - effectively the full roster of the new regional coalition. The caveats are real: he won by less than one percentage point, governs a deeply divided country, and the left - led by Petro, who has refused to concede gracefully - will remain a significant political force. None of this negates the fundamental shift. Colombia is moving from a government that scared foreign investors away to one that is explicitly and urgently trying to bring them back.

Brazil: The Wild Card

Brazil is the most complex piece of the regional picture and the one with the highest stakes for US business. It is Latin America's largest economy and, according to US government estimates, the largest source of South American FDI into the United States - with a job-creating FDI stock of $30.6 billion (Atlantic Council, 2025).

The Trump-Brazil relationship has been a study in miscalculation and recalibration. Trump threatened 50 percent tariffs tied to the Bolsonaro trial. The tariffs backfired, strengthening Lula's domestic position rather than weakening it. Brazilian business leaders marched to Washington to warn of inflation risks from coffee and beef tariffs. Trump backed down, and by late 2025 had proclaimed 'excellent chemistry' with Lula.

"President Trump is currently interested in a more constructive relationship with President Lula and with Brazil. These strategic considerations were central to the shift."

Brian Winter, Editor-in-Chief, Americas Quarterly; Vice President of Policy, Americas Society/Council of the Americas - CEBRI Journal, February 2026

What changed the calculus was Brazil's critical minerals. Brazil holds the world's second-largest rare earth reserves behind China. A deal giving US companies access to those reserves - reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains - is enormously valuable to the Trump administration's broader strategic agenda. Lula, facing a dead-heat October election against Flavio Bolsonaro, has signaled willingness to facilitate legislation attracting US investment in exchange for tariff relief.

The October 4 election is the variable that matters most. A Flavio Bolsonaro presidency would align Brazil with the new regional coalition - accelerating privatizations, tightening fiscal policy, deepening the US security relationship, and signaling to Chinese investors that their position in Brazil's energy and infrastructure sectors faces new constraints. A Lula reelection would mean continued pragmatic navigation. Either outcome leaves Brazil as a major destination for US investment. The question is the terms and the timeline.

The China Dimension

No analysis of the US hemispheric realignment is complete without acknowledging what it is explicitly designed to counter. China is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and most of South America. Chinese FDI is concentrated in energy, infrastructure, and digital infrastructure. The Trump administration has made clear that displacing Chinese influence from the hemisphere's strategic sectors is as central to its Latin America policy as any narcotics or immigration objective.

Alexander Gray's Atlantic Council analysis stated explicitly that the Venezuela operation creates 'a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality' by ensuring 'extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence.' For US companies, this creates both an opportunity and an obligation. The companies that position themselves in Colombia, Venezuela, and post-transition Cuba in the next 12-24 months will have structural advantages over those that wait for perfect conditions.

What Practitioners Need to Watch

From the perspective of someone who has worked with governments, multilateral institutions, and corporate clients across these markets for 25 years, three operational conclusions stand out.

First, the alignment signal now matters as much as the commercial case. Governments across the region are making explicit choices about which side of the new hemispheric divide they sit on. Companies that have established relationships with both US government stakeholders and the new generation of conservative Latin American leaders are positioned to move faster and with less friction than those approaching these markets cold.

Second, the multilateral institutions are being repositioned. The IDB and IFC are operating in an environment where US strategic priorities and development finance objectives are increasingly aligned. Programs supporting security, energy independence, critical minerals, and private sector development in aligned countries will have access to capital and institutional support that was not available under previous administrations.

Third, Venezuela and Cuba require patience, not absence. The instinct to wait until political conditions stabilize fully before engaging is understandable. This is not a normal cycle. The first-mover advantages in Venezuela's energy sector and Cuba's post-transition consumer and infrastructure markets will accrue to those who begin building relationships, conducting due diligence, and establishing institutional presence now - not when the headlines declare stability.

A Note of Caution

Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the risks that balance the opportunities. The Venezuela operation was widely condemned as a violation of the UN Charter and international law - Chatham House's international law programme called it an action with 'no justification in international law.' The cost of extended military deployments for the campaign, estimated at over $600 million according to the Center for American Progress, came with no clear end game for Venezuela's governance.

As historian Greg Grandin has argued, Trump is operating on a model of 'domination without hegemony' - pure force and transactional relations rather than the sustained diplomatic and institutional engagement that produces durable outcomes. If the Venezuela transition deteriorates, if Cuba becomes a humanitarian catastrophe rather than a political transition, or if the Lula-Trump relationship frays again ahead of the October election, the current alignment could shift quickly.

Business planning in this environment requires scenario analysis, not just optimism. What is not in doubt is that the hemisphere has changed. The relationships, coalitions, and market conditions that existed 18 months ago have been fundamentally altered. Companies and institutions that update their Latin America strategies to reflect this new reality - rather than operating on assumptions formed in a different era - will be the ones best positioned to capture the opportunities that follow.

About the Author

Alejandro Morales is Managing Partner of IBD Advisors and Alpinefort Partners, with 25 years of experience in international business development, trade mission architecture, and public affairs across the Americas and Southern Europe. He has advised governments, multilateral institutions, and corporate clients across Latin America and the Caribbean, produced FDI editorial content for the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Institutional Investor, and the International Herald Tribune, and works with Apex Partners on the annual Tiger States investment dialogue between Brazil's leading regional economies and US capital markets. He can be reached at alex@intlbdadvisors.com.

Sources & References

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Council on Foreign Relations. "Trump's Maximum Pressure Campaign on Cuba, Explained." March 31, 2026. cfr.org

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